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TRADEOFFS IN FUNCTIONAL ALLOCATION BETWEEN
SPACECRAFT AUTONOMY AND GROUND OPERATIONS:
THE NEAR (NEAR EARTH ASTEROID RENDEZVOUS)
EXPERIENCE

S. C. Lee and A. G. Santo
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory,
Johns Hopkins Rd.,
Laurel, Maryland 20723

Abstract
1. Background

Today's modem spacecraft often fly a
computing power equivalent, or nearly
equivalent, to the computing power available
to the ground operations team. This enables the
spacecraft to perform many functions
autonomously that previously could only be
planned and carried out from the ground. In
some cases, this increased computing power is
required to perform functions that must be
carried out on the spacecraft. For example,
fault detection and correction must be carried
out on the spacecraft when the time scale of
critical faults is shorter than the time between
ground contacts. In many given function. In
implementing these functions, tradeoffs
between ground operations and spacecraft
autonomy must be considered.

The NEAR mission takes advantage of an unusual
opportunity that occurs only once every seven years
to reach to the Near-Earth asteroid 433 Eros. It
will make the first comprehensive, spatially
resolved measurements of the geology, mineralogy,
and elemental composition of an asteroid.
Mission Design
The spacecraft launched from the Eastern Test
Range in Cape Canaveral, Florida in the late
afternoon on February 17, 1996. This was the
second day of the sixteen day launch window.
Figure 1 shows an ecliptic plane view of the
mission trajectory!. During the 36-month cruise
to Eros, the spacecraft passes within 1200
kilometers of the main belt asteroid 253
Mathilde, on June 27, 1997. The Mathilde
encounter will produce the first close up images
of a C-class asteroid.

With a maximum time of 12 days out of ground
contact and a round-trip light time as high as
56 minutes, NEAR requires a moderate degree of
onboard autonomy to react to faults and safe the
spacecraft. Beyond the basic safing
requirements, many additional functions can be
carried out onboard. For example, momentum
management, center-of-mass management
during velocity change maneuvers, and optical
navigation are all functions considered for
onboard autonomy on NEAR. The allocation of
these functions to onboard software or to ground
operations involves tradeoffs such as
development time for onboard software versus
ground software, up link/ downlink bandwidth,
resource management, life cycle costs, and
spacecraft safety.

One week after the Mathilde encounter, a large
trajectory correction maneuver is executed to
target an Earth swingby. This will be the first
use of the bipropellant system. When the
spacecraft passes close to the Earth in early
1998, the Earth's gravity bends the trajectory to
match Eros's orbital plane. This sets up the
optimal geometry needed for the slow
approach to Eros in 1999. At that time, several
rendezvous maneuvers insert the spacecraft into
orbit around Eros. This allows intensive study
of the asteroid for up to a year.
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Figure 1 Mission Trajectory

spacecraft is designed with a distributed
architecture where subsystems do not share common
hardware.

Spacecraft Design
Figure 2 shows the spacecraft in the deployed
flight configuration2 • A 1.5 m high gain antenna
(HGA) and four solar panels are mounted on the
outside of the forward deck. Most electronics are
mounted on the forward and aft decks. The science
instruments, except for the magnetometer, are
hard-mounted on the outside of the aft deck with

The telecommunication subsystem is an X-band
system capable of simultaneously transmitting
telemetry data, receiving spacecraft commands and
providing a frequency coherent ranging capability.
Besides the HGA, a medium gain fanbeam antenna
is mounted on the forward deck, and two low gain
hemispherical antennas are mounted to the
forward and aft decks. Redundant, unswitched
transponder / command detector unit (CDU) pairs
are connected to the antennas through a coaxial
switching network, allowing two separate
command reception paths at independent data
rates. Two data rates are supported: a 7.8 bps rate
used for emergency communications and a 125 bps

co-aligned fields- of-view. The magnetometer is
mounted on the HGA feed. The interior of the
spacecraft contains the propulsion module. The
solar panels, the HGA, and the instruments are all
fixed in place. The entire spacecraft must be
rotated to point various components, such as the
HGA at Earth or the solar panels at the Sun. The
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rate is for normal communications. The redundant
telemetry conditioning units (TCUs) are crossstrapped to the transponder exciters. Eight
downlink data rates are used from 9.9 bps to 26.5
kbps. The selected rate is a function of the
downlink coding scheme, the NASA Deep Space
Network asset, the spacecraft to earth distance,
and the Sun Spacecraft-Earth geometry. The 9.9
bps rate is used for emergency recovery.

recorders, a power switching unit to control
spacecraft relays, and an interface to a redundant
1553 standard bus for communicating with other
processor-controlled subsystems. The redundant
components are cross-strapped among themselves,
and among the redundant uplink chains of the
telecommunications subsystem. The functions
provided by the C&DH subsystem are command
management, telemetry management, and
autonomous operations.

The power system comprises four gallium arsenide
solar panels, a 9 amp-hour super NiCad battery,
and the power system electronics. The spacecraft
bus is regulated at 33.5 + / -O.5V when the solar
array power is adequate to supply the load and
battery charge power. The bus follows the battery
voltage whenever the battery is in discharge.

The Guidance and Control (G&C) subsystem is
composed of a suite of sensors for attitude
determination, actuators for attitude corrections,
and processors to provide continuous, closed loop
attitude control. In operational mode, the attitude
is controlled to a commanded pointing scenario. In
safe modes, the G&C maintains the solar panels
pointed to the Sun for maximum power, and
attempts to place the Earth within the mediumgain antenna pattern to establish ground
communications.

1.S-m antema

The facility instruments carried on the spacecraft
are a visible-light imager, an IR spectrograph, a 3
axis magnetometer, an x-ray / gamma-ray
spectrometer, and a laser rangefinder.
II. Spacecraft Autonomy and Mission
Operations Tradeoffs
There are a number of issues to be considered in
trading off between spacecraft autonomy and
ground operations. The first issue is time
criticality of operational and safing events. In
some instances, ground control of events is not
possible, because of round-trip-light-time
(RTI.T) and ground contact frequency
considerations. For example, an asteroid flyby
may require autonomous closed-loop pointing, if
the uncertainty in the asteroid location does not
allowed a pre-planned sequence and the RTLT
does not allow ground intervention. For safing,
both the RTI.T and the frequency of ground
contact enter into the tradeoff. Even if a safing
event occurs during a pass, the damage may be
done before the RTLT allows the ground to learn
of and correct the failure. Further failures
that occur between ground contacts must be
handled autonomously if the spacecraft cannot
survive with the failure for the longest
possible time between contacts. For example, if
a battery goes into unexpected discharge, the
battery may be depleted before the next ground

Instruments

Figure 2 Flight Configuration
The interior of the spacecraft contains the dual
mode propulsion module. The propulsion module
contains the three propellant and two oxidizer
tanks, 11 hydrazine monopropellant thrusters
grouped into six different pods, and the 450N
bipropellant thruster. The location of the
propulsion tanks is selected to maintain the
spacecraft's center-of-mass along the thrust vector
of the 450N thruster throughout the mission as the
bipropellant is depleted.

I

The Command and Data Handling (C&DH)
subsystem comprises redundant command and
telemetry processors, redundant solid state
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contact when Mission Operations could correct
the source of the power drain.

key personnel are needed in several areas (both
within and among programs). Many tradeoffs
are decided on the availability of a key
personnel resource. For example, if the flight
software development is behind schedule, and
additional personnel with the right
qualifications cannot be added, then a flight
software function, such command syntax
checking, could be moved to the ground
software. The planned quality of personnel is
an additional consideration. If the Mission
Operations team is to consist primarily of
individuals with little technical knowledge,
then more automation and correctness checking
on the spacecraft allows that team to carry out
operations.

In-flight performance is another tradeoff area.
Often, on-board software can increase
spacecraft performance and reduce required
spacecraft resources. For example, using onboard accelerometers and gyroscopes for closedloop control of a change in velocity maneuver
(deltaV) can increase bum efficiency and reduce
the required amount of on-board propellant. If
the spacecraft mass margins are sufficient,
however, ground-calculated open-loop deltaV's
reduces the complexity of the on-board
software.
Increasing the complexity of the on-board
software increases both the development time
and the chances that a bug exists that may risk
the mission. On the other hand, human error is
often a source of failure. The tradeoff between
these two sources of risk must be considered in
allocating functions between spacecraft
autonomy and mission operations. For a mission
critical risk, measures may be implemented
both on the ground and on the spacecraft to
check for a fault. To assess the relative risk of
human error versus a flight software bug, many
factors must be taken into account. The
maturity of the software development process,
the flight software team experience, the
mission operations team experience, and the
complexity of the planned operations all must
be considered.

Other resources may also enter the equation.
For example, computer resources are another
area that can force a tradeoff. Only limited
types of processors are available for flight use,
and their number on-board may be limited as
well. At some point, the computer resources onboard may not be able to handle all the desired
tasks, and some may have to be placed on the
ground
A fifth important tradeoff is uplink and
downlink bandwidth. Many functions can be
moved to the spacecraft that are done on ground
computers, the only benefit being a reduced
uplink or downlink bandwidth. For example,
by flying a command sequence generator, the
uplink bandwidth requirement is reduced. Onboard lossless data compression can save
downlink without sacrificing any information.

Schedule risk can also be an important driver of
tradeoffs between spacecraft autonomy and
mission operations. The spacecraft
development is driven by a launch schedule.
Functions that can be done on either the
spacecraft or the ground and are not needed
until late in the mission cannot be allowed to
drive the spacecraft development schedule.
For an interplanetary launch, there may be a
very restricted launch window, but a long
(years) cruise period before a science encounter.
During that cruise period, ground software and
procedure development can continue, but the
flight software generally must be completed
before launch.

Finally, mission life cycle costs must be
considered in making on-board autonomy versus
ground operations tradeoffs. The question is:
where can a requirement be met with the least
cost? The cost of developing and testing flight
software is considerable, when appropriate
quality assurance procedures are followed. The
cost of developing ground software or procedures
may be less, but the recurring cost of ground
execution over the mission lifetime may exceed
the flight software development costs. For
example, the more ground contacts that are
planned and paid for every day, the less onboard autonomy is required. In addition,
tradeoffs may be made to minimize
organizational costs over multiple missions.
For example, an organization might chose to

Resource management is a fourth issue when
deciding tradeoffs. Personnel resources are
seldom unlimited. Often, the talents of certain
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implement a standard spacecraft command
language. This would move software
traditionally done on the ground to the
spacecraft with an additional cost to the first
spacecraft, but with potentially lower costs for
future programs.

unattended period. Any serious fault affecting a
critical spacecraft subsystem results in remedial
action (such as turning off a primary system and
bringing a backup on-line) and entry into one of the
safe modes. All safe modes cause the spacecraft to
point the solar panels at the Sun. Table 1 lists
events that are detected by the on-board safing
algorithms and result in safe mode.

III. NEAR Tradeoffs
With a 27-month development time and a fixed
16-day launch window, schedule was the
primary driver of NEAR spacecraft design
decisions. This consideration drove the
development team to minimize the
requirements for the on-board autonomy. Only
when another consideration, such as time
criticality, performance or risk overrode the
schedule was on-board autonomy used.

Table 1
Safe Mode Events
G&C Computer Reset
Switch to Backup G&C Computer
DeltaV Abort
Autonomous Thruster Use
Star Tracker Failure/ No Star ID
Digital Sun Detector Failure
Switch to Backup Gyroscope
Bus Regulator Failure

An example of an operational tradeoff driven
by time criticality is an autonomous algorithm
to detect depletion of the bipropellant
oxydizer. To meet mass margins, NEAR
planned no margin in the amount of oxydizer it
carried. The spacecraft has two oxydizer
tanks. Because oxydizer use cannot be
completely equalized between the tanks, two
depletion burns were anticipated where one
tank would be emptied at a time. If a bipropellant burn is carried on more than 6
seconds after oxydizer depletion, the thruster is
damaged. At the time of the planned oxydizer
depletion burns, the RTLT is 40 minutes. To
assure that the engine survives the first
depletion bum, an on-board algorithm is needed
that detects oxydizer depletion and shuts down
the burn within 6 seconds. With the extra 6 kg
of fuel allowed by the final spacecraft dry mass
and the extremely low Delta launch errors,
NEAR may have sufficient oxydizer margin
that this algorithm will not be used.

Battery Charger Failure
Battery Discharge
Battery Over-temperature
Solar Array Lockup
Fuel Tank Overpressure
C&DH 1553 Bus Failure
Loss of Mission Time
Low Voltage Sense (26V)
Bus Voltage<23 V
Command Lost Timeout
Last Resort Timer Reset
Sun Keep-in Violation

The majority of the on-board safing is also driven
by time criticality and time between ground
contacts3• A critical aspect of spacecraft safety is
power. Because the spacecraft can operate on
battery power only for a short period «2 hours),
keeping the fixed solar panels pointed towards the
sun and the spacecraft load below the solar panel
output is the first priority of the safing design. The
NEAR mission design includes one 12-day, nocontact passage behind the Sun, so the safing was
designed for spacecraft survival over a 12-day
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While correct operation of the G&C subsystem
is time critical, on-board processor resources
limited the amount of on-board safing that
could be performed for the G&C. The ultimate
check on the accuracy of the G&C is to compare
expected to actual sensor input for a given
control output. The expected sensor input would
be calculated by a simulation of the spacecraft
dynamics (a truth model). If the difference
between the expected and actual inputs fall
outside a tolerance, fault correction actions
could be initiated. The processor resources on
NEAR were insufficient to run an on-board truth
model. Checks on the G&C operations were

limited to simple reasonableness checks on
mode, sun angle limits, and sensor input.

new macros, etc. The on-board software could
have contained tables designating used memory
areas and executed commands to protect and
release various areas. These features would
prevent inadvertent ground corruption of onboard macros. This function was allocated to
the ground because of schedule, and also
personnel resource restrictions.

A ground/ flight software tradeoff based on
performance involved on-board closed-loop
deltaV control. One way to achieve a given
deltaV is to calculate the correct pointing
vector and burn time on the ground. After
directing the spacecraft to point correctly, the
ground simply commands the needed thrusters
on for the bum time. Some NEAR burns can and
will be performed in this fashion. During the
asteroid phase of the NEAR mission, small,
extremely accurate deltaV's must be performed
weekly to maintain the spacecraft orbit about
the asteroid. The accuracy of these small burns
cannot be achieved open-loop from the ground.
To realize the required performance, NEAR
needed accelerometers and a closed-loop
algorithm on-board to control these burns.

Early in the C&DH software development, the
Mission Operations team requested that the
C&DH implement a command to save a time
and pointer to the current solid state recorder
location, to make management of downlink
data easier. In retrospect, this feature is easy
to implement and would have been of great
benefit to Mission Operations. At the time, the
schedule risk to the C&DH team seemed
higher than the benefit gained by Mission
Operations, however, and the request to add
this new requirement was turned down.

When time criticality and performance did not
require on-board software, functions were
allocated to the ground. One operational issue
on NEAR was the requirement to balance the
fuel use among the three fuel tanks so as to
control the spacecraft center-of-mass within
certain tolerances. Controlling the spacecraft
center-of-mass is necessary because the thrust
vector of the large bipropellant thruster is
fixed. The misalignment between the thrust
vector and the spacecraft center-of-mass must
produce less torque than the small
monopropellant thrusters can offset. At first, it
was thought that fuel tank switching must be
an autonomous function carried out by the G&C
during the course of a bum to keep the
spacecraft from tumbling. Analysis showed,
however, that the center-of-mass could be
controlled to a factor of 10 better than the
requirement simply by using pre-planned ground
commands to switch the tanks. The choice was
made to leave tanking switching as a groundcommanded function due to limitations in flight
software personnel resources (schedule).

Command verification is a function with many
components. Checksums or Cyclical
Redundancy Checks can be used to check for
errors introduced by the uplink. Commands can
be checked for illegal opcodes, or out-of-limit
parameters. Finally, command sequences can be
checked against operational constraints. For
example, a NEAR operational constraint is to
tum off the power amplifier before changing
the position of any RF coaxial switch. For
NEAR, the choice was made to check for
transmission errors and command syntax onboard, but flight software personnel resource
constraints forced the operational constraint
checking to be left to Mission Operations.
Consideration of risk, however, did require onboard command verification affecting the
critical spacecraft systems after they are
executed. For example, on-board safing
algorithms maintain the minimum complement
of spacecraft subsystems at all times. Because a
faulty deltaV maneuver can easily cause
mission failure, all bum parameters are
checked both on the ground and by the on-orbit
software before a deltaV is performed.

Memory management is another example of a
NEAR requirement that is allocated to the
ground operations. The NEAR on-board
processors have the capability of storing
sequences of commands fro execution at a future
time. The memory areas where these command
'macros' are written must be carefully managed
to avoid overwriting portions of macros with

Risk assessment also factored into the
functional allocation of momentum management
between on-board algorithms and ground based
operations. The NEAR spacecraft is normally
controlled (except during deltaV maneuvers),
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by four reaction wheels. External torques (for
example solar radiation pressure) can
eventually build up the spacecraft system
momentum to the point that wheel control is no
longer possible. Before this point, system
momentum must be dumped by the application
of an external torque - either using the on-board
thrusters, or solar radiation pressure. Planned
momentum management from the ground is both
feasible and preferable. Using solar radiation
torques, momentum can be dumped along two of
three inertial axes with no fuel use. Even if
thrusters are required to dump the momentum,
doing so under ground control while in contact
with the spacecraft is safer than autonomous
thruster use by the spacecraft.

unit. The basic science requirements are met
without on-board data compression, but an
improvement in performance can be realized
with it. Due to schedule pressure and personnel
resource limitations, data compression was
made a goal, not a requirement, for the imager
software. Fortunately, the imager
development allowed the addition of several
data compression algorithms.
Another type of data compression was not
implemented on NEAR. The NEAR telemetry
system samples and records or transmits
housekeeping data using a simple time
commutation system. This is an inefficient use
of bandwidth, because very slowly changing
data is replicated for weeks on end. A more
efficient scheme uses on-board intelligence to
only downlink data when it has changed
sufficiently to merit ground controller attention.
Due to personnel resource limitations, no such
feature was implemented on NEAR. To allow
the ground controllers a "quick look" feature, a
data summary table, giving the highest and
lowest value of each housekeeping parameter,
with a time for each, is implemented. Using
this feature, Mission Operations can scan this
table and decide if any playback of recorded
housekeeping data is necessary.

On the other hand, should momentum build up
faster than anticipated by the ground, or if

ground contacts are delayed longer than
expected, a high system momentum would cause
mission failure. Therefore, a backup,
autonomous momentum dump algorit1:un is
implemented on-board. If system momentum
exceeds a critical, programmable threshold,
the on-board algorithm uses the thrusters to
dump momentum to a safe level. Checks on the
use of the thrusters are divided between two of
the on-board processors, so that a single errant
processor cannot inadvertently trigger
autonomous thruster use.

The tradeoff driver that had the least impact
on the NEAR allocation of functionality
between the spacecraft autonomy and Mission
Operations is mission life cycle cost or
organizational cost. The fixed and extremely
short development time (27 months) made
schedule the overriding consideration. For a
short development schedule, the incremental
costs of adding personnel were insignificant.
Early during the NEAR concept development,
consideration was given to putting optical
navigation capability on-board for both cruise
and asteroid operations. This feature would
have reduced mission operations cost by
eliminating the navigation team. However, in
contrast to ground-based navigation which is
well-understood and commonly performed, onboard navigation algorithms needed to be
developed and verified over a considerable
time period. Therefore ground navigation is
baselined to reduce the schedule risk.

Another area where on-board software is used
to reduce the potential for human error is the
calculation of spacecraft pointing vectors. The
on-board software uses a generic pointing
definition when the ground needs to control
attitude to any orientation in inertial space.
This generic facility could be used for all
attitude maneuvers, even those used frequently
such as pointing the HGA at the Earth. To use
the generic scenario for this purpose however,
requires the Mission Operations team to
compute the specific parameters for the
pointing definition with each use. To lower the
risk of human error, several "canned" pointing
scenarios are implemented on-board, using onboard spacecraft know ledge, such as point HGA
at Earth and point solar panels at Sun.
Some on-board software was developed for
NEAR to reduce downlink requirements. Onboard data compression of images is
implemented on the imager data processing

Still, some additional on-board software was
written to reduce the Mission Operations load.
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After launch, when schedule pressures were
reduced, an algorithm for autonomous
momentum management using solar radiation
pressure was developed. This algorithm is
incorporated in an upload (required for other
reasons) planned for the near future. This
feature will be tested in flight, and if it works
as planned, may be incorporated in future
missions, reducing the cost of Mission
Operations for these missions.

organization. This will allow reuse of Mission
Operations tools and reduce training costs. In
the future, "driving" a spacecraft will be
analogous to driving a car, where experience
with one model allows operations of other
models without knowing the internal details.
This trend is beginning in the standardization
of command languages (e.g., SCL), but no
progress has been made on standardizing
downlink.

Even with the considerable effort that went into
allocation of functions between the ground-based
operations and the on-board software, lessons are
always learned during the actual operation of a
spacecraft. Part of the on-board autonomy on
NEAR is implemented as a series of rules and
command macro responses that are reprogrammable
from the ground. While this added some
complexity to the on-board software, it allowed
the flexibility to move some functions from the
ground to the spacecraft as the operations team
gains experience with the spacecraft. For example,
this feature is used by Mission Operations for data
recording and downlink management, replacing the
need for the on-board data management command
Mission Operations had requested and was denied
during development. This use for autonomy rules
was never considered by the flight software
designers. Autonomy rules are also being used to
time repetitive commands, a function that was
planned to be accomplished by pre-calculated
timetagged commands uploaded from the ground.
While providing flexibility generally implies
more software complexity and risk, its benefits far
outweigh the cost of the development and test time
needed to provide it safely.

• Autonomy will be increased on-board, to
compensate for reduction in the frequency and
duration of expensive ground contacts. For deep
space missions, on-board navigation can really
reduce the need for ground contact during the
cruise phase.
• On-board data management will increase in
sophistication. Recorders will become random
access devices. Data compression and even onboard data analysis will increase to reduce the
requirement for downlink. Data sharing among
subsystems will be possible as networking
architectures are implemented on spacecraft.
Selective downlink will be a reality.
• Reduced costs will also force increased code
reuse and off-the-shelf hardware. When
forced to use standard components, the ability
to optimize any particular application will be
decreased. In the future, spacecraft will be
produced to give the best result at a fixed cost,
rather than optimal performance at any price.
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• The uplink and downlink interfaces to
spacecraft will be standardized within an
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